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INTRODUCTION
The escalation of commitment to a particular course of
action has, in the past eleven years, become an increasingly
popular area tor research in the psychological aspects of
decision making.

The major question posed by this line of

research is: "Does an individual become so committed to a
particular course of action that he/she can no longer
analyze the situation objectively and, consequently, makes
irrational decisions to continue investing when such
activity is no longer advisable?"

Staw (1981) states that

the escalation phenomenon can occur when an individual
becomes overly committed to a chosen course of action.

He

adds that the underlying assumption of this line of research
is "that individuals may go beyond the passive distortion of
adverse consequences in an effort to rationalize a
behavioral error" (p. S19).

In other words, if an

individual is comaitted to a particular course of action,
then he/she may colllllit a greater aaount of resources,
following negative feedback, in order to "turn the situation
around" and in an attempt to eventually appear competent.
Many researchers have developed different models in order to
interpret this phenomenon or, as posited by some
researchers, the lack thereof.

Many of the researchers have

adapted this phenomenon to situations that we have all faced
at some point in our lives.
describes the following case:

Por example, Staw (1981)
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An individual has spent three years
working on an advanced degree in a field
with minimal job prospects (e.g., in the
humanities or social sciences).

The

individual chooses to invest more time
and effort to finish the degree rather
than switching to an entirely new field
of study.

Having obtained the degree,

the individual is faced with the options
of unemployment, working under
dissatisfying conditions such as
part-time or temporary status, or
starting anew in a completely unrelated
field.

(p. 577)

Any number of interpretations could be developed for the
above situation.

The individual may not have realized just

how grim future job prospects would be (lack of
information), or the individual could have rationalized to
himself that a change would be impractical

(self-justification/cognitive dissonance), or the individual
may have thought that his family would perceive the sudden
change as irrational (external justification), plus many
other possible interpretations.
From the preceding example, on• can realize the
numerous interpretations available in analyzing escalating
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commitment and its psychological effects on decision making.
However, despite the great number of possible
interpretations, if the phenomenon of escalating commitment
to a course of action can be understood and explained to the
corporate world, then many irrational business or investment
decisions, caused by a misinterpretation of the facts or for
psychological reasons, could possibly be avoided in the
future.
This review will discuss the past literature on the
escalation of commitment and will be organized by the
different interpretations of the phenomenon.

First, the

original interpretation, self justification, will be
discussed.

This will be followed by several other

interpretations that have been proposed since that time.

Self Justification
Staw (1916) started the escalation research with his
study entitled, "Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of
Escalation to a Chosen Course of Action."

In this study,

Staw used a business game in which the participant could
recover losses through the commitment of resources.

The

business game consisted of information concerning the
financial information from the last ten years on the "Adams
and Smith Company."

The case stated that the profitability

ot th• company had started to decline over the last several
years.

The subject, acting as the Financial Vice

President, was provided with 10 million dollars to invest in
one of the two largest divisions of the corporation.

After

completing the first allocation, the subjects were provided
with information concerning the status of the company in the
five years following this initial allocation.

The first

allocation decision was used to manipulate either prior
success or failure while the second allocation was used to
study the allocation tendencies following the previous
success or failure.

A 2 X 2 factorial design was used in

which decision consequences and personal responsibility were
manipulated.
The decision consequences were manipulated so that half
of the subjects were provided information that the course of
action originally chosen had subsequently performed better,
while the other half of the subjects were provided with
information demonstrating the opposite outcome.
The personal responsibility of the subject was
manipulated by providing half the subjects with a situation
that would produce high responsibility while the other half
were provided with a low responsibility situation.

In the

high personal responsibility situation, the subject actually
made both of the allocation decisions described in the case.

In other words, the subject made the initial allocation and
then received the information concerning the financial
■ tatu■

of the company

decision.

■ inc•

their initial allocation

Por the low personal responsibility subjects, the

entire case was presented at the same time.

These subjects

were only asked to make the second allocation decision.

The

case given to the low personal responsibility subjects
explained that the initial allocation decision was made "by
another financial officer of the company."
The dependent variable was the amount of money invested
in a previously chosen investment alternative (chosen either
by the subject or another financial officer mentioned in the
case).

Staw concluded that the data revealed that .

individuals invested a substantially greater amount of money
when they were personally responsible for negative outcomes.
Staw (1976) also states that the data supported the
hypothesis that "individuals who are personally responsible
for negative consequences will increase the investment of
resources in a previously chosen course of action" (p. 41).
Staw (1976) interpreted his findings from the
self-justification perspective.

Staw proposed that when

individuals personally select an investment alternative
which results in negative outcomes, they try to take
concrete actions in order to reduce negative consequences
for which they feel they are personally responsible.

In

other words, the individuals, working under the optimistic
assumption that the chosen course of action will eventually
"turn around," allocate more resources so that they will be
able to recoup their initial losses when, in fact, the
chosen alternative does "turn around."

The impetus of
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escalation research has been directed at the individual's
behavior when the chosen alternative does not "turn around,"
but instead continues to fail.
A follow-up of the previous study was conducted by Staw
and Fox (1977).

This study used the same basic format as

Staw (1976) except that all subjects were only exposed to
negative consequences and the number of trials was extended
to three.

In general, the allocation sequence consisted of

the initial choice to allocate 10 million dollars to one of
two alternatives.

Following this initial allocation

decision, the subject proceeded through three more
allocation decisions.

These three decisions provided the

basis for the examination ot escalation tendencies.

The

number of trials was extended in order to see if the effects
of high personal responsibility would extend over time, even
if the subject may not have been responsible tor the initial
investment decision.

Three independent variables were

manipulated in this follow-up study: personal
responsibility, efficacy of resources, and time.

The

dependent variable was the aaount ot resources committed.
The results ot this study replicated the results of the
original study at Time 1, but at Time 2 and at Time 3 the
subjects' investment activities tailed off, indicating a
de-escalation phenomenon.

More specifically, tor the high-

responsibility subjects, there wa• a sharp deer•••• in
resources committed from Time l to Time 2 with only a slight
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rebound at Time 3.

The low-responsibility subjects

maintained or slightly increased their resource commitments
across the three time periods.

The results further

demonstrated that in three out of the four conditions
manipulated the greatest amount of resource commitment took
place on the first decision, the least amount of resource
commitment took place at Time 2, while an intermediate
amount was invested at Time 3.
Staw and Pox (1977) interpreted these results by
stating that escalation did not diminish over time when
individuals were provided with negative feedback or
" punishment" over repeated trials.

However, the findings of

this study demonstrate that the effects of escalation over
time can become rather complex.

Staw and Pox concluded by

stating that escalation may result from an unrealistically
high estimation of the capabilities of the individual's
material resources coupled with personal involvement in
determining a prior course of action.

Staw (1981), in

examining the results of these two studies taken together,
concluded that they "did not provide evidence for a totally
self-justifying administrator" (p. 579).

Continuing his

analysis of these studies, Staw (1981) reports that subjects
did not persist undeviatingly in the face of continued
negative results or ignore information about the possibility
of future returns.
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The inconsistencies found in the two above mentioned
studies resulted in a third study conducted by Staw and Ross
(1978).

This study involved an examination of the

individual's cognitive processing after success or failure
in an investment decision.

Staw and Ross tried to connect

the apparent gap between the results of Staw (1976) that
demonstrated escalation and increased resource allocation,
and the results and Staw and Fox (1977) that demonstrated a
de-escalation phenomenon.
independent variables.

Staw and Ross manipulated two

The previous success or failure of

the individual's investment and the causal information about
the setback were varied.

First, the subject was faced with

an investment decision in which he/she had to choos~ one of
several different resource allocation alternatives.

In the

second part of the experiment, the subject had to make a
similar investment decision except in this decision all of
the alternatives chosen by the subject led to a setback.
Half of the participants were provided with an exogenous
reason for the project's failure.

This exogenous reason was

an external factor that could not have been predicted from
the information provided and was probably not likely to
occur again.

The other half of the subjects were provided

with an endogenous reason for the setback.

This factor was

an integral part of the earlier decision, and it had a good
probability of occurring again in the future.
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The results of this study demonstrated that the
subjects who had experienced a previous failure and who
faced an endogenous setback committed the least amount of
resources (28.57 million).

The subjects who had experienced

prior failure and who were faced with an exogenous setback
committed the greatest amount of resources (48.~0 million).
The previous success endogenous and the previous success
exogenous condition fell in between the range set by the
previous failure groups (39.33 and 44.67 million,
respectively).

Staw and Ross (1978) concluded that Brehm's

( 1966) theory of reactance was the only theoretical
interpretation that could explain the data fully.

Reactance

theory predicts that when an individual has been exposed to
a failing situation, he/she will become motivationally
aroused to re-establish his/her sense of competence.

The

authors state that the present data, which shows that
individuals give more attention to causal information after
a failure than a success, could be related to this arousal.
Staw and Ross also posit that individuals may not
necessarily become trapped into escalating cycles of
commitment, and that any tendency to escalate can be
hindered by very clear negative results associated with an
endogenous cause.

However, the data also revealed that

individuals may continue to invest large amounts of
resources when provided an external cause

for their failure

and some hope of future recovery from their losses.

This is
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demonstrated in that the subjects who suffered an exogenous
setback as well as an earlier failure invested more
resources than subjects in any of the other conditions.

In

conclusion, the results seem to indicate that a prior
failure led to increased sensitivity to information about
the causes for a future setback.
Fox and Staw (1979) expanded the escalation of
commitment to a course of action with their study that
simulated the position of the trapped administrate~.

They

defined the trapped administrator as someone in need of
external justification and one who will lose, most likely
politically, if a particular program does not eventually
succeed and, consequently, has little choice but to . remain
fully committed to the program.

Fox and Staw experimentally

manipulated job insecurity (high and low) and resistance
from others to their (the administrator's) policy (high and
low).

Generally, the allocation sequence consisted of an

initial 10 million dollar allocation choice between one of
two alternatives followed by .feedback concerning the support
or resistance of a committee to the subject's choice.

This

feedback was followed by a 0-20 million dollar allocation
decision of R & D funds to the previously chosen
alternative. The dependent variable was the amount of
resources committed.

,ox and ltaw (1171) found that job insecurity and
policy reeietanc• did affect an individual's commitment to a
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course of action.

High job insecurity and high policy

resistance led to the greatest amount of resource
allocation.

Conversely, the subject's in the low job

insecurity and low resistance condition committed the least
amount of resources. Fox and Staw conclude that both
internal and external justification may influence commitment
and that these effects may be additive.
Conlon and Wolf (1980), in an attempt to expand the
escalation paradigm, studied the moderating effects of
several variables on the escalation phenomenon.

The three

manipulations consisted of involvement· (high or low),
visibility (high or low), and the cause of the setback
(foreseeable/persistent or unforeseeable/transient)..
Following the allocations, the subject's were asked on a
questionnaire to describe the process they used in making
the allocation decision.

This information was then analyzed

to determine if the subject used a calculative or
noncalculative problem solving strategy.

Calculating

subjects would use information attained from the initial
budget figures, the actually expenditures made thus far, the
state of completion of the project, and the likelihood that
the cause of the failure would continue, whereas
non-calculating subjects would not use this type of
information.
Conlon and Wolf found that the foreseeability/
persistence effect found in Staw and Ross (1978) is
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dependent upon the presentation of the problem as structured
or unstructured.

A structured problem, according to Conlon

and Wolf, is one that requires a calculative decision
strategy .

The subjects who used a calculative strategy did

not demonstrate the escalation phenomenon as reported in
Staw and Ross (1978).

In conclusion, Conlon and Wolf found

that the strategies used to solve the problem (calculative
vs. non-calculative) can affect the escalation tendencies,
especially concerning the foreseeability/persistence
variable studied in Staw and Ross (1978).
Brockner et al.

(1982) investigated the different

psychological factors that affect escalation of commitment
over time.

Brockner et al. conducted two experimen~s, and

the results of these experiments taken together suggest that
the effects of certain situational-personality variables on
the amount of resources committed depends on where the
subject is in the time sequence of the escalation process.
In general, the results found that economic motivations are
more important in the earlier stages of an entrapping
dilem while face-saving variables tend to be of more
importance in the later stages.

Brockner et al. state that

the practical implications of this study are that the
variables influencing an individual to exit an entrapping
situation in the beginning may be totally different from the
factors that would motivate th• individual to exit at•
later point in time.
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Attribution Theory
In a study conducted by McCain (1986) the limits ot
escalation and the following period of de-escalation were
examined.

McCain's study was an attempt to analyze the

self-justification interpretations that had been popular in
the research prior to this experiment versus an attribution
theory interpretation of the escalation, de-escalation
sequence.

The self-justification interpretation predicts

that the percentage of investors who quit allocating
resources should be relatively high at the beginning and
decrease over successive investment periods.

Conversely,

attribution theory predicts that investors eventually learn
that they must abandon resource allocation after repeated
failures.

Attribution theory then suggests that the longer

an individual invests the more likely he/she will be able to
stop subsequent resource allocation.
McCain used a case similar to the one used by Staw and
Fox (1977).

The subject assumed the role of Financial Vice

President for a large company.

The company was described as

having declined in recent years and that management had
indentified several divisions that could improve with
further investment.

The division chosen by the subject

continued to decline, whereas the other alternatives, it
present, improved.
The independent variables manipulated in this study

were commitment and the investment alternatives available to
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the subject.

Commitment was manipulated in a similar manner

as previous studies.

Half of the subjects chose the failing

alternative for their allocation, whereas the other subjects
inherited the failing alternative and made an insignificant
choice for their first allocation decision.
Three dependent variables were used in this study.

The

first dependent measure was the amount of money allocated to
the failing company in each period.

The second dependent

measure was simply the total amount allocated over all
periods to a chosen course of action.

The third dependent

measure was the period in which the subject quit allocating
resources.

The experiment included 10 periods: however, the

subjects were not required to invest in each period~
Therefore, a dependent measure could be attained by
recording the period in which the subject allocated no
resources to the chosen alternative.
The results of McCain's (1986) study did demonstrate
the escalation phenomenon at the initial stages of
continuing investments.

McCain also found that subjects who

were ottered a nwaber of different investment choices quit
funding the failing investment sooner than the subjects that
were not offered a choice in investment alternatives.

This

result is in conflict with the results demonstrated by Staw
(1976), who reported the high commitment subjects as
demonstrating greater escalation tendenci••·

The ••calation

effect found in this study disappeared following the fir•t
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allocation.

These results are consistent with the results

found by Staw and Fox (1977).

Perhaps the most important

finding of McCain's study was that the high-commitment
subjects stopped investing earlier than the low-commitment
subjects.

These results conflict with the basic underlying

thesis of escalation research, that is, that subjects
escalate their commitment to a chosen course of action and
because of this commitment increase they continue to invest
in order to justify their high level of commitment~
Therefore, as McCain's results seem to suggest, commitment
may not be the dominant process in either the escalation or
de-escalation process.

McCain concludes that attribution

theory is a better interpretation of the initial escalation
and subsequent de-escalation sequence.
McCain's attributional theory interpretation of his
results engenders a new theoretical interpretation of the
escalation phenomenon.

When analyzed at a more general

level, several components of attribution theory offer
predictions concerning escalation tendencies.

The

discussion will now turn to a more general analysis of the
components of attributional theory that may apply to
escalation, namely, internal/external and stable/unstable
causal attributions.
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Internal/External and Stable/Unstable
Internal/External and Stable/Unstable refer to the different
causal attributions an individual can make concerning a
behavior. In the escalation paradigm, the individual is
making causal attributions concerning the causality of the
failed allocation.

Attribution theory would predict that if

the cause of the failure is external and unstable, then
greater allocation tendencies would follow.

In other words,

if the individual received information that the failure was
due to

an external unstable source (e.g., a hurricane) then

he/she would invest more resources.

The decision maker

would conclude that the external unstable event (hurricane)
will probably not occur again in the near future, therefore
not producing another failure.

Since the cause of the

failure is not likely to occur again in the near future, the
individual will allocate more resources and may increase the
allocation in order to compensate for the initial losses
incurred from the hurricane.
Conversely, if the individual perceived the cause of
the failure as an internal stable variable (e.g., a poor
manager in charge of the chosen alternative), then the

decision maker would conclude that the cause of the failure
will continue in the future and, consequently, allocate
fewer resources.

In other words, if the cause of the

failure is inherent within the project it ■elt, then the
project will continue to fail in the future, therefore
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obviating any need for further resource allocations.

These

are precisely the results observed in the Staw and Ross
(1978) study previously cited.

The other combinations,

external/stable and internal/unstable, should produce
allocation amounts that fall between the two extremes
described above.
Bowen (1987) contradicts all of the previous literature
by denying the escalating phenomenon and reducing the
tendency to "throw good money after bad" as strictly a
decision dilemma rather than a behavioral tendency.

Bowen

posits that the subjects in the past research were faced
with very equivocal situations and that under these
situations a reasonable response would be to invest . more
resources in an alternative which uncertainly appeared to be
failing.

Bowen proposes a model consisting of different

levels of equivocality of feedback and how the different
feedback situations affect the commitment to a course of
action.

Bowen posits that a high level of equivocality

combined with a high commitment level would most likely
produce escalation tendencies.

The condition of lower

equivocality and high commitment could also lead to
escalation tendencies but to a lower extent.

The higher

equivocality and low commitment should produce less frequent
escalation decisions than the two conditions mentioned

above. Finally, the lowest probability of escalation
tendencies is predicted for the group exposed to low
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equivocality and low commitment to the course of action.
Therefore, through the development of this model, Bowen
suggests that the tendency to "throw good money after bad"
occurs from difficult decision dilemmas, not the need for
the investor to justify previous actions, and escalation
tendencies can be predicted by a model that integrates the
equivocality of the decision feedback and the level of
commitment to the chosen course of action.
The present study is designed to expand upon the
existing body of escalation research by providing a more
stringent test of the escalation phenomenon.

Several

different aspects of the previous research will be expanded
upon in the present study, coupled with a new depen~ent
variable which will engender a better understanding of the
escalation tendency.

The present study is designed to

accomplish four objectives.
First, this study will take a step back from the
current direction of escalation research and analyze the
phenomenon using two types of allocation consequences.
Recently, the vein of the escalation research has been using
groups in which the allocation decision results only in
negative feedback (i.e., a failure).

In the present study,

the first group will simulate the majority of escalation
research in that the results of each allocation will result
in a failure. However, a need exists in the current
literature to look at this "failing" group with respect to•

19
neutral group across a series of investment trials.
Therefore, the present study will employ both a fail and
neutral group.
Second, this study will examine the moderating effects
of the information variable that Bowen (1987) proposes will
eliminate the increase in resource allocation following a
failure.

The low information condition will simulate the

majority of the previous escalation research by providing
rather general feedback concerning the results of the
preceding allocation.
Bowen ' s

The high information group will test

(1987) prediction that providing the subject with

very specific information will reduce the equivocality of
the decision and, thereby reduce any escalation tend~ncy.
Third , the present study will use two new dependent
variables that should add to the interpretive power of
future escalation research.
be used in the present study.

Three dependent variables will
The first dependent variable

will be the amount of resources committed to the chosen
alternative . This is the dependent variable that has

traditionally been used throughout the escalation research.
Two new dependent variables will be included in the present
study which should allow a more thorough interpretation of
the results.

The two new dependent variables will consist

of the specific information the participant used in
rendering the allocation decision and the number of
informational variables listed in the decision process.

The
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number of variables used and the information used in the
decision should help identify some of the cognitive
processes used in allocation decisions.
Fourth, the present study will help clarify a possible
problem with some of the past research in the escalation
domain.

Staw and Ross (1978) examined the effects of

different causal feedback on the escalation tendency
following either a success or failure.

Staw and Ross

presented the participants with either an exogenou~ or an
endogenous cause. However, in presenting this causal
feedback, Staw and Ross included another variable that may
have influenced the subject's perception of the causal
feedback.

Specifically, Staw and Ross told the half the

subjects (exogenous condition) "that a highly unusual amount
of rain throughout the region was apparently responsible for
the delay in the project" (p. 52).

These subjects where

also told that the "rainfall had been more than double the
yearly average and that generally weather conditions were
quite stable in the region" (p. 52).

Staw and Ross

summarize the exogenous setback as low in both

foreseeability and persistence.

The other half of the

subjects received an endogenous cause for the p.r eceding
setback.

Staw and Ross sWDJDarize this information as being

higher in both foreseeability and persistence.

The

combination of foreseeability and persistence 1• th•
possible problem with this study.

In effect, Staw and Ro••

21

are combining foreseeability and persistence into one
variable.

Thus, the results cannot be clearly attributable

to either the foreseeability or persistence, because there
is no separation of these two variables in the Staw and Ross
study. The present study will separate these two variables
across the series of trials so that the effects of
foreseeability (internal/external) and persistence
(stable/unstable) on the escalation tendency can be better
understood.

The four possible combinations of these two

variables will be counterbalanced across the 4 allocation
trials for each subject.

METHOD

Subjects
The subjects in this experiment were 61 graduate
students pursuing a Master's degree in business
administration.

More specifically, all of the subjects were

enrolled in either a course in Quantitative Business
Decision or Financial Management.

Design
The experimental design was a 2 X 2 X (2 X 2) ~ixed
factorial design with the sequence of the within subjects
variables counterbalanced over the different allocation
periods.

The four independent variable manipulations were

information (high/low) and the results of the allocation
decision (neutral/fail) along with two within subjects
variables consisting of two types of causal feedback,
namely, internal/external and stable/unstable.
Three dependent variables were used.

These variables

consisted of the amount of resources allocated, a list of
the factors that were used in the allocation decision, and
the number of factors listed.

ftft
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Procedure
The experiment was introduced by explaining that it
involved an examination of the allocation tendencies of a
financial officer.

The subjects were then provided with a

written case study that put the subject in the role of a
financial officer facing a decision concerning the expansion
project of the "Amalgamated Forest Products" company, a
revised version of the financial case presented in Melnyk &
Barngrover (1971)

(Appendix 3).

The case explained the

processes that the financial director (the subject) used in
identifying the chosen alternative.

This process deviates

slightly from some of the previous escalation studies that
offered the subject a choice between several alternatives.
The rationale used in this study was to present the
arguments that the financial director (the subject) employed
in order to identify the chosen alternative, therefore
convincing the subject that the chosen alternative was the
best option.

This method of presentation held the choice

variable constant while also holding the commitment variable
constant by providing enough evidence to dictate a high
level of commitment to the alternative.

The subjects were

provided with this general case material a week before the
allocation decisions were actually made.

This time period

enabled the subjects more than adequate time to digest the
twelve pages of general information concerning the expansion
project.
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The end of the general case described to the subject
that in order to begin funding the new expansion project, an
initial outlay of $1 million had been allocated two months ·
ago.

The following week, the subjects were provided with

information that described the progress of the construction
project since this initial outlay of funds.

Following this

feedback, the subject was faced with the first allocation
decision which funded the following two month period.

This

first allocation decision was followed by causal information
concerning the outcome that the resource allocation had on
the expansion project.

This process of an allocation

decision followed by feedback was continued for a total of 4
trials and subsequent feedback periods (the last trial was
not followed by feedback).

Immediately following an

allocation decision, each subject received feedback
concerning the outcome of this allocation.

Four different

types of feedback were provided during the feedback periods.
The four types of feedback consisted of external/stable (an
outside competitor), external/unstable (rain),
internal/stable (a key man), and internal/unstable (a labor
strike) information.

These four types of information were

counterbalanced over the four feedback periods.

The same

reason was used for both the failing (project behind
schedule) and neutral (project on schedule) feedback
conditions.

For example, the external/un•table condition of

an outside competitor consisted of an outside competitor
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starting construction of a nearby plant for the failing
condition while the neutral condition described the sudden
closing of a competitor's nearby plant.

The

external/unstable condition of rain was an unusually dry
period for the neutral condition and an unusual abundance ot
rain for the failing condition.

The internal/stable

condition of the key man was the hiring of a key man in the
neutral condition, and the unexpected death of a key man in
the failing condition.

The key man was described •as an

individual who had numerous political ties with the
Brazilian government.

A labor strike resulting in a saving

of funds due to the hiring of "scabs" was described in the
neutral feedback for the internal/stable variable, w_i th an
increase in costs due to a strike settlement being described
in the failing condition.
Each allocation decision proceeded in the following
manner.

After reviewing the initial case material (or

feedback material), each subject was provided with a piece
of paper to record the amount of his/her allocation.

This

paper also contained a question asking the subjects to list
the informational variables used in rendering their
decision, and also asking the subjects to distribute 100
percentage points across the identified information
recording each variable's weighting relative to its
importance in the decision (Appendix 4).

This procedure was

repeated for each of the four allocation decisions.

RESULTS

Independent Variable Check
The information independent variable was analyzed in
order to ensure that the high/low manipulation was indeed
evident.

Sixteen Industrial/Organizational psychology

graduate students rated the "degree of perceived difference"
in the high and low information scenarios for both the
neutral and failing feedback conditions.

An Analysis of

Variance (ANOVA) delineated several significant differences.
The analysis of the four different feedback scenarios
produced a significant main effect, f(3, 96)
.01.

m

14.13,

~

<

The feedback for months l & 2 received the highest

rating of "perceived difference" with a mean of 6.15 on a
seven point scale with 7 representing the largest degree of
perceived difference.
5 & 6

(M

(M

Months l & 2 were followed by months

= 5.74), months 3 & 4

= 4.76), respectively.

(M

= 5.59) and months 7 & 8

The main effect of the neutral

and failing feedback was not significant, l(l, 32) = 3.0,
= .09.

~

The interaction of months and feedback was

significant !(3, 96) = 5.78,

~

= .002.

Figure 1 illustrates

that in the fail condition, the rating of the "amount of
perceived difference" between the high and low information
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conditions demonstrated significantly lower ratings for the
feedback provided for months 5 & 6 and for months 7 & 8.

In

the neutral feedback condition, significantly lower ratings
were evident for months 3 & 4 and months 7 & 8.

These

significantly lower ratings resulted in an adjustment in the
degree of informational difference in both the fail and
neutral conditions.

For the failing feedback, the degree of

informational difference between the high and low
information condition was increased for months 5 & 6 and
months 7 & 8.

For the neutral feedback, the amount of

informational difference was increased for months 3 & 4 and
months 7 & 8.

Based on these subsequent adjustments, the

degree of informational difference between the high ~nd low
information conditions was assumed to be equated.
In the present study, the main effect of sequence was
not significant, f(3, 45)

=

.61,

~

=

.61.

In other words,

the sequence in which the subjects received the four
combinations of the internal/external and stable/unstable
variables did not significantly affect their average
allocation tendencies.

As mentioned previously, the four

combinations of the internal/external stable/unstable
variables were counterbalanced across subjects. In light of
this non-significant main effect, the sequence in which the
subject received the causal feedback was excluded from all
subsequent analyses.
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Objective 1

Dependent Variable - Dollars Allocated
The first experimental question analyzed was if
escalation had occurred across all subjects and conditions.
Escalation was operationally defined as an allocation
exceeding $1 million dollars on the subject's first
allocation.

The results of this analysis demonstrated that

the subject's first allocation did not significantly depart
from $1 million dollars producing a mean allocation on the
first period of 1.0082, !(60) •

.1385,

~

= .4451.

The previous research in escalation has generally not
used a neutral feedback condition.
found that escalation did occur.

This research had also
Therefore, in order to

more accurately analyze the results of the present study,
the subjects provided with failing feedback were isolated in
order to determine if their first allocation exceeded $1
million.

The results of this analysis also demonstrated

that escalation did not occur~ in fact, the mean of the
first allocation for the failing feedback condition did not
even exceed $1 million dollars

(M

= $941,500).

Consequently, no analysis was necessary to conclude that
escalation did not occur for the failing condition.

Since

the previous research has generally not included a neutral
feedback group, this group wa• iaolated in order to
determine if escalation occurred.

Escalation did not occur
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in this group either, M

= 1.0727,

!(30)

= 1.3693,

p

=

.090&.

These results clearly indicate that escalation did not occur
across all subjects or across the neutral or failing
feedback conditions, that is, none of the first allocations
for any of the groups listed above departed significantly
from the $1 million dollars budgeted.
After the feedback variable had been analyzed, an ANOVA
was run on the first allocation period in order to determine
if the between subjects factors of feedback or information
affected the allocation tendencies of the subjects or if a
significant interaction existed between the feedback and
information variables.

A 2 X 2 ANOVA demonstrated no

significant differences for the main effect of feedback,

f(l, 57) = 1.31,
f(l, 57)

=

.57,

~
~

= .2553; the main effect of information,

=

.4~98; or the interaction of feedback

and information f(l, ~7)

= .37,

~

=

.55.

In summary, the

analyses of the first allocation demonstrated that neither
the failing nor neutral groups' first allocation
significantly departed from $1 million dollars which
contradicts the findings of previous escalation research.
Furthermore, neither of the between groups factors, feedback
(fail/neutral) nor information (high/low) affected the first
allocation tendencies of the participants.
The second phase of the analysis consisted of a 2 X 2
(2 X 2) mixed factorial ANOVA to determine if the alloc&tion
decisions over repeated trials were significantly affected
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by the main effects or any of the interactions of the 4
independent variables.
The main effect of feedback (fail/neutral) was
significant, f(l, 57) = 10.68,

~

= .002.

Figure 2

illustrates that the mean across all four allocation periods
for the neutral group was $960,000 while the mean allocation
for the failing group across all four allocations was
$650,000.
~

= .77;

The main effects of information, f(l, 57) = .08,
internal/external, l(l, 57) = .03,

stable/unstable, f(l, 57) = .34,

~

~

= .8~; and

= .57 were not

significant.
The results of the main effect of feedback are in
direct contrast to the previous research of the escalation
phenomenon in that the failing group allocated significantly
fewer resources than the neutral group.

One reason that may

have accounted tor at least some of this difference was the
average number of periods funded.

An ANOVA was conducted

in order to analyze if the average number of periods funded
was significantly affected by either of the two between
groups variables or the interactions.

The main effect of

feedback was significant, l(l, 57) = 24.82,

~

< .001.

The

neutral feedback subjects funded an average of 3.87 of the 4
funding periods while the subjects exposed to failing
feedback funded an average of only 2.34 of the 4 possible

funding

period■ .

Th• main effect of information and the

interaction were not significant.

As a result of the
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subjects in the failing conditions abandoning the project
significantly earlier than the neutral subjects, the main
effect of feedback was repeated using the mean dollars
allocated only when the subjects were actively funding the
project.
The result of this revised version of the main effect
of feedback produced no significant results for the main
effect of feedback, f(l, 52) = 3.5, 2 = .06; information,

r(1, 52) = .29, 2 •
1.33, 2 = .25.

.60; and the interaction, f(l, 52) =

This revised analysis provides even stronger

support for the lack of escalation in the present study.

In

summary, when analyzing the periods in which the subjects
actually funded the project, there were no significant
differences between the failing and neutral group with
respect to the amount of funds allocated.
Using all four allocation periods, all of the second
order interactions, namely, feedback by information, f(l,

57) = .46, 2 •
• 3.81, 2 •
1.57, 2 •
.24, 2 •

.51; feedback by internal/external, f(l, 57)

.0528; feedback by stable/unstable, f(l, 57) =

.21; information by internal/external, f(l, 57) =
.63; information by stable/unstable, f{l, 57) =

1.52, p = .22; or internal/external by stable/unstable , f(l,
57) •

.80, 2 •

.38 produced non-significant differences.

Only the three-way interaction of feedback by
internal/external by stable/unstable produced significant
effects, f(l, 57) • 14.27, 2 = .001.

The post-hoc analyses
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revealed that in the neutral feedback condition (F.i gure 3)
there was no two way interaction between the
internal/external variables and the stable/unstable
variable.

In other words, for the neutral feedback

condition, neither level of the internal/external variable
was affected by the differing levels of the stable/unstable
variable.

Therefore, the underlying significance of the

feedback by internal/external by stable/unstable interaction
resides in the failing feedback condition.

In the failing

condition (Figure 4), the internal condition was
significantly influenced by differing l~vels of the
stable/unstable variable.

The internal/stable

(M

=

$430,000) condition resulted in significantly lower
allocations than the internal/unstable, M = $750,000, ~(1,
57) = 8.50,

~

= .01.

The external condition, for the

subjects exposed to failing feedback, was not significantly
affected by the differing levels of the stable/unstable
condition, I(l, 57) = 1.86,

~

= .17.

In summary, the

significance of the feedback by internal/external by
stable/unstable three-way interaction resides in the
significantly greater allocation tendencies of the
fail/internal/unstable ($750,000) versus the
fail/internal/stable condition ($430,000).
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Objective 2
The information variable was included in all of the
analyses and produced no significant difference in any of
the analyses.

Objective 3

Dependent Variable - Number of Variables Listed
A 2 X 2 X (2 X 2) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted
using the number of variables listed by- the participants as
being used in their decision making process as the dependent
variable.

Of the main effects, only feedback produced

significant results.

The neutral feedback condition

reported an average of 3.15 variables used in the decision
making process while the failing condition reported an
average of 2.29.
= 6.91 ,

~

This difference was significant, f(l, 57)

= .01.

Here again, the results of this ANOVA could have been
influenced by the fact that the failing feedback subjects
abandoned the project significantly earlier than the neutral
feedback subjects.

In other words, if the participants

exposed to failing feedback stopped funding earlier, then
these subjects would have a zero listed for the number of
variables used in all remaining decisions.

This zero for

the remaining trials could have been responsible for
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lowering the mean of the number of variables used in the
decision, thereby producing the significantly lower number
of reported variables.

Therefore, the analysis was repeated

using the average number of variables listed up to and
including the first allocation of $0.

The first allocation

of $0 was included because most of the subjects listed the
variables used in rendering the decision to abandon the
project.

This analysis produced no significant main effects

or interaction. In conclusion, neither the neutral/failing
feedback nor the high/low information variables affected the
number of variables the subjects listed as being utilized in
the decision making process.

Dependent Variable - Informational Variables Listed
The informational variables listed by the subjects as
being an important factor in the allocation decision were
compiled into a master list.

Prom this master list, the

variables that were listed by 10 or more of the 61 subjects
were included for each the subsequent analyses.

Nineteen

variables were listed by 10 or more subjects and, therefore,
were included in the Chi-Square analyses.
The first Chi-Square analysis that was conducted
analyzed the frequency with which the subjects exposed to
neutral or failing feedback chose each of the nineteen
variables.

In other words, for each of the nineteen

variables, a 2 X 2 Chi-Square was conducted analyzing the
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number of times the variable was chosen/not chosen in the
neutral and failing condition.

Six of the resulting

nineteen Chi-Squares were significant.
The reduced (failing feedback) or the increased
(neutral feedback) availability of raw materials in the
competition scenario produced a significant Chi-Square,
Chi-Square(!,~= 61) = 4.26, B = .04.

Of the 31 subjects

exposed to neutral feedback, the frequency of the listing of
the "raw materials" variable was roughly equated ... In other
words, it was listed by 15 subjects and not listed by 16
subjects.

However, the frequency of the listing of "raw

materials" by the subjects exposed to failing feedback was
significantly different.

Only 6 subjects listed "raw

materials" in the failing condition leaving 24 subjects who
did not list "raw materials" as being important to their
decision.

In summary, the increased supply of raw materials

in the neutral condition seems to be much more salient to
the subjects than the reduced supply of raw materials to the
subjects exposed to failing condition.
The five other significant Chi-Squares were for the
following variables: "schedule (on/behind)" in the
competition scenario, Chi-Square(!,~= 61) = 4.25,

~

= .04;

"competitor (opened/closed)" in the competition scenario,
Chi-Square(!,~= 61) = 10.10, ,2 = .001; "find out why
competition closed" in the competition scenario,
Chi-Square(l, ~ = 61) = 9.34, ,2 = .002; and "the key man••
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experience (gain/loss)" in the key man scenario,
Chi-Square ( 1, !! = 61) = 17. 05,

~

= . 002.

The interpretatio•n

of these significant Chi-Squares is somewhat difficult.
However, the following interpretations can be pos.i ted.

In

the competition scenario, the schedule was more salient in
the neutral condition than the fail condition (chosen more
frequently).

The closing of a nearby competitor's plant

(neutral feedback) was more salient that the opening of a
nearby plant ( failing feedback).

Pu.r thermore, 10 of the 31

subjects exposed to neutral feedback listed the
informational request to "find out why the competitor's
plant closed" as being important in their decision making
process.

Of course, no one exposed to the failing feedback

listed this request for information, because they received
feedback concerning the opening of a nearby plant by a
competitor.

The only other significant Chi-Square was in

the key man scenario in which a significantly greater number
of subjects listed the acquisition of a key man (neutral
condition) rather than the death of a key man (failing
condition) .
The second Chi-Square analysis investigated the
subjects that chose each variable in more detail, namely,
investigating the frequency distributions across the
neutral/fail feedback or the high/low information conditions

tor each

■ cenario,

In

other words, each of the

informational variables listed by the subjects were compiled
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for each of the feedback scenarios. Then all of the
informational variables listed by the subjects in their
decision for the "key man" scenario were listed.

Any

variable that was chosen by 10 or more of the 61 subjects
was included in the subsequent Chi-Square analyses.

Table 1

(Appendix 2) lists the informational variables that were
chosen by 10 or more subjects in each of the feedback
scenarios.

The resulting Chi-Square analysis analyzed the

relative frequency of the given variables occurring in a 2 X
2 Chi-Square consisting of the two between subjects
variables. For example, in the key man scenario, the
political connections of the key man were listed by 21 of
the 61 subjects.

The Chi-Square analyzed the frequency

distribution of these 21 occurrences across the two between
subjects variables, namely, neutral/failing feedback and
high/low information.

Seventeen Chi-Square analyses were

conducted, one for seventeen of the nineteen variables
listed in Table 1.

For two of the informational variables

listed, a Chi-Square analysis could not be conducted because
no subject chose this variable in the fail condition.

These

two were the "competitor (open/close)" in the competition
scenario and "find out why competition closed" also in the
competition scenario.
Two of the seventeen Chi-Squares were significant.

In

the strike scenario, of the people who chose "schedule," the
subjects in the neutral feedback condition chose this
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variable more frequently in the low (11) rather than high
(5) information condition.

Conversely, the subjects in the

failing feedback condition chose "schedule" more frequently
in the high (8) rather than the low (1) information
condition.

This difference in relative frequency was

significant, Chi-Square(l,

~

= 25) = 5.53, 2 = .02.

The

interpretation of this significant Chi-Square is somewhat
difficult to explain other than that in the neutral feedback
condition, the subjects exposed to low information were more
aware of being on schedule than the subjects exposed to high
information. The reverse is true for the subjects in the
failing feedback condition, that is, the subjects exposed to
high information were more aware of the project being behind
schedule than the subjects exposed to low information.
The second Chi-Square analysis that was significant
concerned the "political connections" of the key man who was
either hired (neutral feedback) or killed (failing
feedback).

Of the people who listed the "political

connections" of the key man, the subjects in the neutral
feedback condition listed this variable more frequently in
the low (12) rather than high (2) information condition.
Conversely, the subjects in the failing feedback condition
chose the "political connections" of the key man more
frequently when exposed to high (5) rather than low (2)
information, Chi-Square(l,

.r! • 21) • ,.e3, 2 • .03.

39

All of the other Chi-Squares were not significant, with
the largest non-significant Chi-Square occurring for the
"soils test/foundation problems" in the rain scenario,
Chi-Square(l,

~

= 19) = 1.85,

~

=

.17.

The real question that needs to be answered at this
juncture is "How does one interpret all of these Chi-Square
analyses?"

While it is very difficult to interpret many of

the Chi-Square analyses, one general conclusion can be
posited.

The results of the Chi-Square analyses indicate

that the variables that the subjects used in rendering their
allocation decision seem to be very situation specific.

In

other words, the variables listed are dependent on the
information presented to the subject and even within . this
situation described by the information, the subjects list a
great number of different variables (an average of 41.75
unique variables across the four scenarios).

This

situational specificity is by no means an earth shattering
conclusion and, in tact, it seems very logical that
variables listed by subjects are, and should be, dependent

on the situation.

However, the interesting aspect of this

conclusion is that none of the variables in any situation
were listed by more that half of the 61 subjects (see Table
1) .

In fact, in order for a variable to make the top five

most frequently chosen variables for any of the four
scenarios, it only had to be listed by 10-12 (16-20-) of the
subjects.

Thus, one can conclude that it may be quite
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difficult to develop one universal theoretical
interpretation of allocation decision making based upon the
widely disparate information listed by the subjects in the
present study.

Objective 4
The past research by Staw and Ross (1978) found that
when provided with failing feedback, participants allocate
significantly greater resources when provided with.
external/unstable causal information than when provided with
internal/stable feedback.

In the present study, the mean

allocation for the fail/external/unstable condition was
$650,000 while the fail/internal/stable condition produced a
mean allocation of $430,000 across the four allocation
periods.

This difference was not significant, f(l, 57) =

1.66, R = .20.

DISCUSSION
The results of this study do not support the previ,o us
research in the escalation of commitment to a chose.n course
of action, especially with respect to the actual amount of
resources allocated.

However, some of the informational

variables listed by the participants as entering into their
decision process do support some of the past theoretical
interpretations of the escalating phenomenon.

The present

study was designed in order to accomplish fou.r specific
objectives which were described previously.

The following

discussion will examine each of these four objectives and
their relationship with the results of the present study .
The first objective of the study was to take a step
back from the current escalation research and analyze the
phenomenon using two types of feedback, neutral and
negative.

The negative feedback was to simulate the past

research while the neutral feedback wa.s to provide a
"control group" for the purposes of compa.r ison.
The actual resource allocations made by the subjects in
the present investigation do not support previous research.
More specifically, no escalation tendencies were,
demonstrated by the subjects.

In much of the past research

(Staw, 1976; Staw & Fox, 1977; & McCain, 1986 ), an
escalation tendency had been demonstrated on the first
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allocation decision by subjects exposed to failing feedback.
The results of the present study not only do not support
this escalation but, in fact, the average allocation by the
failing subjects on the first trial was below the budgeted
$1 million dollars ($941,150).

These results seem to

indicate that several discrepancies may be inherent in
either the present study or the past research.
study does depart from much

The present

of the past research in several

respects, namely, MBA students were used in an attempt to
obtain more knowledgeable and rational decision makers; a
more detailed general case was provided- to the subjects (12
pages of general information of the expansion project,
projected sales, Return on Investment requirements ~d
calculations, etc.); and, finally, the subjects were given
one week in order to review this general case material
before actually rendering the allocation decisions.

This

time period between the dissemination of the general case
material and the actual allocation decision, while providing
the subjects adequate time to familiarize themselves with
the expansion project, also relinquished some of the control
in the experiment in that one could not ensure that the
subjects actually studied the material during this time.
Nevertheless, all of these factors should have lead to more
informed and rational decision makers which, at least with
respect to some of the variables analyzed, wa• not the ca••·
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The second objective of the current study was to
examine the moderating effects of the information variable
(reduced equivocality) that Bowen (1987) proposed would
eliminate the increase in resource allocation following a
failure (failing feedback).
Bowen (1987) hypothesized that the escalation of
resource commitment could stem from a "decision dilemma 11
rather than some of the psychological influences reported in
previous research.

Bowen stated that in past research the

participants were presented with equivocal information and,
as a result, could not rationally analyze the situation and
render an appropriate decision.

The present study attempted

to manipulate this equivocality by providing half of the
subjects low information, in an attempt to simulate past
research, while the other half of the subjects were provided
with very explicit information which included specific costs
associated with each piece of feedback and explicit Return
on Investment (ROI) information explaining how much a
$100,000 allocation over budget would affect the project's
ROI.

The results of the present study, however,

demonstrated that the information variable had absolutely no
effect on any of the dependent variables analyzed (dollar
allocation, number of variables list in decision, or time
period funding was stopped).

Apparently, even though half

of the subjects were provided with very specific
information, they neither utilized this information in their

decision nor let it influence their decision to stop
funding.
The third objective of the present study was to
introduce a new dependent variable that should add to the
interpretive power of future escalation research.

This new

dependent variable consisted of having the subjects list the
information from the case that they used in rendering their
allocation decision.

This new dependent variable was

designed to provide more detailed information concerning the
psychological aspects of allocation decision making rather
than analyzing only the amount of funds allocated.
As stated previously, several factors in the present
study were included in order to hopefully obtain more
rational decision makers.

However, several of the reasons

that the subjects listed as influencing their allocation
decision and the resulting dollar allocation did not appear
very rational.

For example, several subjects listed as one

of the informational variables that they wanted to conduct a
"soils test 11 in order to ensure the foundation of the
project was indeed stable before continuing.

This soils

test would cost $75,000 and was not included in the original
budget.

While some of the subjects wanted to fund this

soils test, many did not allocate any extra funds in order
to pay for the test.

In fact, several students actually

funded under the budgeted $1 million dollars.

Another

subject mentioned that he/she wanted to "punish management"
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for not being able to foresee the problems with the
foundation (problems caused by a fluke ln the weather,
therefore, impossible to foresee) by making local management
conduct the resulting soils test without any additional
funding.

The rationale for this decision appears to be

quite irrational, more specifically, one cannot punish
management for not including unforeseeable occurrences in
the budget.

These examples were not cited in order to imply

that MBA students are irrational decision makers, •but, on
the contrary, to demonstrate the difficulty of conducting an
experiment such as this one in an experimental setting
which, at the same time, adequately represents the real
world.
Some of the informational variables listed, however,
provided support for the previous theoretical
interpretations.

Por example, several subjects listed "sunk

costs" as one reason for continuing their resource
allocation to the expansion project.

This "sunk cost"

reason supports the self-justification theory of Staw

(1916), that is, participants continue investing in order to
justify previous funding by staying with the chosen course
of action long enough to eventually recoup their losses.
This is the classic escalation situation in which the
subject feels as though he/she has "invested too much to
quit."

Another subject listed "the importance of my job to

me" as a reason for continuing the expansion.

This would
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fit into the external justification

(job insecurity)

condition used in Pox and Staw (1979).

These examples,

however, were only reported by a fraction of the
participants, which does have some implications for future
research in the escalation of resource allocation.

The

above examples do support some of the previous theoretical
interpretations of escalation, but these reasons were by no
means universally applied by all subjects when rendering
allocation decisions.

The implication of this limited (only

listed by a few subjects) support of past theoretical
interpretations may be that allocation decision making is
much more idiosyncratic than it has been viewed in the past.
This idiosyncrasy is probably only compounded in the _past
research when subjects with limited knowledge concerning
financial investments are used and when the subjects are
provided very limited information concerning the situation
in which the allocation decisions are to take place (low
information).
McCain (1986) used attribution theory to interpret the
escalation/de-escalation results demonstrated in his study.
At the outset of this study several hypotheses were posited
based on the internal/external and stable/unstable
attribution theory variables.

One of these hypotheses was

supported in the three way interaction of feedback by

internal/external by

■ table/unstable variables.

The impetus

behind thia interaction resided in a difference between the
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fail/internal/unstable condition ($750,000) and the
fail/internal/stable condition ($430,000).

Before the

study, the hypothesis was posited that the internal/stable
condition would result in the fewer resources allocated than
the internal unstable condition.

Therefore, this hypothesis

was supported by the significant results.

However, the

external/unstable condition was hypothesized as resulting in
the largest resource allocaton.

This, however, was not the

case because the largest allocation in this interaction was
in the fail/external/stable condition ($770,000).

These

results provide partial support for the attribution
theoretical interpretation but are far from being
definitive.
As mentioned previously, some of the informational
variables listed as reasons for the decision provided

support for the theoretical interpretations in the past
research.

Thia is also the case for the attribution theory

interpretation.

Table 1 illustrates that in the rain

scenario (external/unstable) eleven subjects listed the
probability of the rain continuing or the dry spell
continuing as a reason for their allocation decision.

This

does support attribution theory in that the subjects did
perceive the weather as being relatively unstable and not

likely to continue in the future.

However, here again, even

though this variable was the most frequently listed variable
that supported past theoretical interpretations, it was far

,a
from being universally applied by all subjects.

Thus, the

same conclusion can be proposed here, namely, that
allocation decision making is more idiosyncratic than
originally assumed.
While not finding much support for the escalation
phenomenon, the present study has provided a new dependent
variable that should be used in future allocation decision
making research.

The dependent variable of the information

variables used in the decision can provide a much greater
insight into the theoretical interpretations of the resource
allocation decision by actually forcing the participant to
justify his/her decision by listing the variables in the
decision.

The use of this dependent variable in the_ present

study did shed some light on the past theoretical
interpretations instead of inferring a causal theory from
the amount of resources allocated to the project.

The use

of this dependent variable in the present study did identify
that allocation decision making may be more idiosyncratic,
and consequently more complicated, than assumed in the past.
The idiosyncratic behavior in the present study makes
this author somewhat skeptical about the ability to
adequately conduct escalation research within a laboratory
setting.

The major underlying thesis is that individuals

become so committed to a particular course of action that

they can no longer objectively evaluate the situation and
make rational decisions.

A possible problem with conducting
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this type of research in the laboratory is that one may not
be able to adequately represent the degree of reality
present in the real world.

For example, the commitment and

degree of pressure applied to a financial officer within the
organization to "turn a particular project around" and "make
it work" would be very difficult to reconstruct in a
laboratory situation.

This reconstruction may even be more

difficult when one considers the personal variables a
financial officer brings to the situation.

For example,

family financial pressures combined with somewhat uncertain
job security that may intensify the need for a financial
officer to succeed in a particular situation.

In summary,

in light of the results of the present investigation_, future
escalation research should be analyzed thoroughly to
determine if the situations developed in a laboratory type
setting can adequately represent the real world.
An additional implication of the idiosyncratic findings

of the present study is that future theory development will
have to take into account these complexities.

Taken

together, the results of the present study indicate that
the current state of allocation decision making theory may
be too simplistic to explain the seemingly complex behavior.
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TABLE l
INFORMATIONAL VARIABLES LISTED BY
MORE THAN 10 SUBJECTS IN EACH SCENARIO
Variables Listed

Humber of Listings

Rain scenario

Employment needs

26

Schedule

20

Soils test/foundation

19

Return on Investment

13

Probability of weather

11

Coapetition scenario
Raw materials (reduce/surplus)

21

Availability of labor

14

Schedule

14

Competitor

11

Pind out why competitor closed

10

Stria acenario
Labor costs (increase/decrease)

2S

Schedule

2S

Return on Investment

16

Union unrest/potential for new union

14

Government problems/inflation/
unstability

11
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TABLE 1 -- CONTINUED

Key aan scenario

Political connections

21

Key man's experience

18

Political unrest

1,

Schedule

11

APPENDIX 3

AMALGAMATED FOREST PRODUCTS
It is the early part of 1980, you, acting as resident
financial director of Amalgamated Forest Products, are in
the process of preparing a financial analysis of potential
production and market expansion opportunities confronting
your firm in Brazil. Amalgamated Porest Products (APP) is
headquartered in a major Brazilian city within the rapidly
growing "industrial triangle" of Rio de 3anerio, Sao Paulo,
and Belo Borizonte. APP is owned by Woodpower, Inc., a
large, vertically integrated, U.S. firm headquarted on the
eastern seaboard.
APP's growth over the past several years has been quite

substantial. More specifically, by the end of the previous
year, 1979, the mean daily pulp production of 380 metric
tons was about se percent above the average daily output of
1975. Due to this growth over the past several years,
Amalgamated Porest Products took the first step towards
vertical integration of its processing of foresty products.
Over the past several years, the company was able to acquire
two used paper aachines from one of its nonintegrated pulp
customers who was forced by circwnstances to reduce its
investment in paper-making facilities. Not long after this
acquisition, APP capitalized on an opportunity to purchase
two additional used machines from another Brazilian mill.
By the end of last year, 1979, these four machines with a
combined capacity of about 160 MTPD (metric tons per day),
or 50,000 metric tons per year, were being fully utilized
and processing about 30 percent of the APP pulp mills'
output into various grades of paper products. Practically
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allot the remainder of APP's pulp output was sold to some
30 ditterent Brazilian concerns engaged either in pulp
bleaching or in manufacturing ot paper products, or both.
The increased profitability resulting trom even this partial
degree of vertical integration had prompted the APP

management, and especially you, to investigate more closely
the future demand and profitability of Brazilian pulp and
paper markets.

Although you could not support your views

with tactual data at that time, you believed that future
prospects tor this industry in Brazil favored continued
expansion on a selective basis.

It properly planned, you

anticipated that substantial rewards would accrue trom such
activities.
In preparing your analysis, you telt that there was a
need to bring in some outside experts so you called on the
services ot a leading international consulting firm.

The

parent company located in the U.S. supported this move, and
had also suggested the use ot this particular tirm.

The

primary purpose of the consulting firm's study was to survey
opportunities in Brazil for profitable expansion in pulp,
paper, and certain converted products during the next tive

to ten years.

A corollary objective was to obtain an

iapartial analysis ot the risks facing APP in the

continuation (and possible future expansion) ot its
operations.
An objective and thorough analysis ot the risks was
important in 1980 because of the recent history ot the
Brazilian economy and the relative instability ot the
Brazilian government in the mid 1910s.

The rate of

inflation has been very high in recent years, with annual
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increases in the price level of l~-20 percent not at all
uncommon. APP management also recalled that the country's
pro-leftist government of the mid 1970s was proposing
changes that might have been harmful to business and that
this was averted in 1978 only by a quick, though bloodless,
military coup. At any rate, the outlook of new Brazilian
government was still uncertain.
The results of the management consultants' study of APP
operations and of Brazilian markets for forestry products
strengthened APP's managements originally favorable
disposition toward vertical integration into production of
paper and paper products.
Market projections for the types of paper pulp products
currently being manufactured by APP indicate definite growth
potential for the next decade (Exhibit 1). However, •there
were some serious doubts as to whether another paper plant
for the production of the currently existing pulp products
could be economically justified before the mid 1980s.
Nevertheless, you voiced a strong concern that, since sales
were already near APP's current capacity in 1980, APP could
possibly lose its market share in the industry as well as
oranizational momentum and competitive position if it were
to delay the expansion until such action would become
feasible, based upon profits, within its current pulp
product lines. There were, of course, other APP executives
who were more content to rely on the current pulp product
lines and their projected sales increases. Therefore, you
took it upon yourself to analyze possible alternatives and
intended to present the results of your analysis to the rest
of top management. Because each of the available
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alternatives involved potentially large amounts of capital, .
you believed that it was highly desirable tor APP management
and the parent company to support jointly any capital
expenditure program that might be submitted tor approval to
the parent company.
The consultants' study had delineated two potentially
profitable new product areas into which the company could
expand advantageously;

(1) coated papers and (2)

high-quality grades of bleached and coated folding boxboard,
along with the profit potential of expanding capacity ot
existing pulp products.
Both ot these new product lines were oriented toward
industrial markets.

The consultants believed that

investment opportunities, related to production and
distribution of consumer types ot paper products, would be
considerably less attractive tor the foreseeable future.
"Consistent with these product line potentials," you
concluded in your presentatiion to the APP executives,
"there appear to be three basic strategy alternatives from
which APP can choose.
are as follows.

In the order ot increasing risks they

Pirst, we could continue on a somewhat

conservative course, leaving our facilities about as they
are today, with no addition.

Then in the mid 1980s, when

justified by the growth in demand for existing products, we
could consider adding new facilities to meet the increased

demand.

A second alternative would involve adding a new

operating facility in the near future that would allow
expansion into (1) coated papers and (2) high-quality grades

ot bleached and coated folding boxes, thereby diversifying
APP'• present product lines and broadening the demand tor
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the company ' s existing pulp products and services.

A third

and somewhat speculative course - but one with the
potentially highest returns - would be an aggressive
acquisition strategy consisting of a wide range of
vertically integrated companies.

This acquisition strategy

would consist of purchasing vertically integrated companies
falling under the general classification of paper products.
"There are, however," you continued, "inherent risks
that exist in each of these situations.
carefully assessed and evaluated.

They must ~e

First, of course, is the

risk of forecasting any market, especially a new or unproven
market .

Then , too, one must reckon with the risk of

overenthusiastic expansion by our competitors, resulting in
excess capacity in the industry and concomitant price

deterioration for our products."
Other risks discussed by the executives present
included the high probability of the lack of economic
stability as well as a continual uncertainty concerning the
structure of tariffs imposed on imports of industrial
machinery and paper products.
After a lengthy discussion, the executives concluded
that APP should follow the second alternative, i.e., the
building of a new operating facility for manufacturing (1)
coated papers and (2) high-quality grades of bleached and
coated folding boxes for Brazilian markets.

The executives

all appeared to agree with you that this somewhat moderate
course offered a balanced approach to the risk exposure.
Moreover, it was highly compatible with potential after-tax
returns and consonant with the company's long-run objective
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of becoming a mainstay in the Brazilian forest products'
industry.
Several days later the management decided to
investigate the feasibility of constructing the new

operating facility with an initial annual capacity of 28,000
metric tons per year, i.e., 80 MTPD.

From consultations

with the company's production executives and from the
examination of market projections prepared by the consulting
firm (Exhibit 1), it was felt that the new facility should
be designed with view on an easy expansion ot its prodution
capacity up to 120 MTPD, or 43,000 metric tons per year.

At

that level, 120 MTPD, it would be possible to achieve
maximal vertical intergration between the new facility's

output and the output of AFP's own pulp mill.

It was

anticipated that this facility could be ready for use by
Janurary, 1981.

The estimated cost of the new facility and

related items was $5 million (Exhibit 3).
With the aid of your own staff and other executives,
you estimated the sales and after-tax income which should be
derived from the proposed expansion (Exhibit 4).

These

estimates were based on the existing state of economy of

Brazil and did not include provisions for inflation or for
unexpected extraordinary costs of operation.
You were well aware that any expansion plan would have
to be approved by the parent company, Woodpower, and would
have to meet their investment standards.

You also knew that

the basic corporate policy of Woodpower, Inc., was to seek a
minimum of 10 percent after-tax return on domestic projects.
However, the nature and the extent of political and
economic risks in Brazil were quite high, necessitating a
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substantial upward adjustment in the required after-tax rate
of return.

As a matter of fact, you knew from previous

discussions with Woodpower executives that the parent
organization would not consider further investments in
projects with risk exposures equivalent to the Brazil
situation at rates of return less than 18-20 percent per
annum based on after-tax net income, or approximately twice
the rate of return sought on U.S. domestic investments.
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EXHIBIT 1

AMALGAMATED FOREST PRODUCTS

MARKET PROJECTIONS BY MAJOR PRODUCT GROUPS ( IN METRIC TONS)

Present Products
Currently ~nufactured

Bleached and Colored

I

New Product

(group A)

Board (group B)

--------------------------1---Market

AFP

1981

188,000

'6,300

1982

2'8,000

55,700

1983

251,600

61,050

198'

256,lOO

66,lOO

1985

267,500

69,6l0

1986

278,500

72,880

1987

289,000

76,220

1988

301,200

79,l60

1989

312,200

82,700

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Market

AFP

I

Coated Papers
New Product
(group C)
Market

AFP

13,800

21,100
37,700

5,950

17,000

2,,so

,1,000

6,US

20,100

2,875

U,300

7,000

23,100

3,300

'8,600

7,950

25,800

3,950

52,900

8,900

28,500

l,600

57,200

9,850

31,100

5,250

61,500

10,800

33,800

5,900

65,800

11,750

36,000

6,550

--------1----
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EXHIBIT 2

AMALGAMATED FOREST PRODUCTS
INCREMENTAL MARKET POTENTIAL, 1981-1988 (METRIC TONS)

--------------------------------

--·--------

1981

1982

1983

46,300

55,700

61,050

66,400

69,UO

72,880

76,220

79,460

82,700

50.000

50,000

50,000

50,000

50,000

50,000

50,000

50,000

50,000

198'

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Potential
Market for Existing
Product Lines
Present
Capacity

----------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------Present product Line
Capacity Available
for new facility

N/A

5,700

11,050

16,400

19,640

22,880

26,220

29,460

32,700

Tons per
day

N/A

16

31

46

55

64

73

82

91

Potential
aarket for new
product lines in
groups B and C
(exhibit 1)

N/A

8,400

9,350

10,300

11,900

13,500

15,100

16,700

18,300

Total increaental
potential tonnages
N/A
existing and new
product lines (new
facility)

14,100

20,400

26,700

31,540

36,380

41,320

46,160

51,000

39

57

7'

88

101

115

128

142

Tons per
day

N/A

CURRENT CAPACITY
EVENTUAL ADOITIONAL CAPACITY
TOTAL

160 MTPD (50,000 PER YEAR)
120 MTPD {43,000 PER YEAR)
280 MTPD (93,000 PER YEAR)
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AMALGAMATED FOREST PRODUCTS
EXHIBIT 3
ESTIMATED CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPOSED EXPANSION (IN THOUSANDS)

I

'

$225,000

•. 5

Foundation &Slab

385,000

7.7

Structural Steel

590,000

11.8

Exterior Nalls &Roofing

695,000

13.9

Total Interior Finish

850,000

17.0

Total Equipaent Costs

2,255,000

_!Ll

Site Work

$5,000,000

RETURN ON INVESTMENT=

RRYl!NUe -

IXPaNSU/eouITY

100.0,

= 1s.ss,
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EXHIBIT 4 AMALGAMATED FOREST PRODUCTS
ESTIMATED CASH FLOW BENEFITS FRON PROJECTED EXPANSION
( IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

----------------------------------------

Year

Increaental
Gross
Sales*

Incr•ental
Profit after
Incoae Taxes

1981

2,7'7

25

1982

4,555

260

1983

8,926

1. 189

198'

10,039

1,,10

1985

10,195

1,490

1986

10,230

1,554

1987

10,,20

1,605

1988

10,,20

1,686

1989

10,,20

1,686

1990

10,,20

1,686

1991

10,420

1,686

1992

10,,20

1,686

1993

10,,20

1,686

119,092

17,6'8

9,161

1,357

Total
Average

*Increaental gross sales shown here for inforaation purposes only.
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Two months ago, you started the new expansion project by
allocating $1 million dollars.

This initial allocation

"started the ball rolling" on the construction phase of the
new operating facility in Brazil.

The projections were

based on the construction of a $5 million dollar plant over
the next 10 months of 1980.

At the present time two months

have passed since your first allocation, therefore leaving 8
months of construction remaining.
This exercise will trace the remaining 8 months of
construction

necessary in order to construct the new

operating plant.

At the end of each two month period you

will be asked to assess the progress of the new facility and
make allocation decisions concerning the expenditures for
the following two months (8 months, 4 allocation periods).
Due to the high rate of return required by the parent
company and the consequent tight cost constraints, the
projects progress should be analyzed carefully at each step
before more funds are allocated to the construction of the
facility.

The parent company has expressed to you that i t

the costs of the project greatly exceed the projections that
require a ROI of 18-20, they would prefer to stop funding
the project and re-evaluate it before continuing.

In order

to continue this exercise you need to turn the page and read
the specific instructions which you will need to follow in
your allocation decisions.

11

For each of the four following allocation decision you will
be asked to record the amount of money you are allocating to
the project, to list any informational variables (taken from
the case or feedback) that you used in rendering your
decision, and, finally, you will be asked to weight the
informational variables you listed with respect to their
relative importance in the decision.

Following each

allocation decision you will receive information concerning
the progress of the expansion project over the two month
period and then, in light of that information, you will be
asked to allocate funds for the following two month period.
You will recall that an initial allocation of $1 million has
already been made and that there are 8 months of
construction remaining (4 allocation periods) at a projected
cost of $4 million.

Please turn the page and read the

feedback concerning the progress of the project over the
first two months.

It is currently the end of month 2 of the

10 month project, and $1 million dollars have already been
allocated.

Turn the page now for feedback concerning the

projects progress over the first two month period.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 1

&

2

The project is behind schedule. The project director
provides the following information concerning the projects
progress over the preceding two months.
"We are behind with regard to our projections. The past two
months contained above average rainfall which severely
hindered our progress over the past two months. This amount
of rainfall should not continue since Brazil usually does
not exceed its normal rainfall averages to this extent. The
following list of items are the ramifications of the excess
rain experienced recently in Brazil."

•

•
•
•

•

•

•
•

Two weeks delay in construction time .
Increase in project costs $100,000 or 2.0, •
This 100,000 includes the time delay, labor disruptions,
and possible foundation damage, but not the following.
In order to be sure about the stability of the
foundation we should conduct a soils test at a cost
of $25,000. Several area engineers recommend
spending the money for the test emphasizing the .fact
that if the test is not conducted and the soil is found
to be unstable after construction is completed we could
run
into significantly more costs in the future. The
engineers estimate that curing a foundation weakness
after completion of the project would cost $250,000 more
than
curing it now.
During the two weeks delay in construction work 75 of
our 800 construction workers quit. In order to
replace these men we will have to pay a 10, premium
price to attract the same quality of workers. We
estimate that it will take approximately 4 weeks to
fully replace all 75 of the lost workers. Total cost to
replace these workers is $25,000.
Several members of upper management are getting a little
nervous because we are falling behind our projections.
They were a little hesitant even before these delays, and
are really closely analyzing the situation.
Additional funding for the next two months required to
correct all of the above problems combined would result
in lowering our ROI .75, (.5, per 100,000).
Every $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or
below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI

.s,.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 3

& 4

The project is behind schedule. The project director
provides the following feedback concerning the status of
the project.
"We are behind our projectons but only because of a recent

labor strike that occurred last month. The laborers were
holding out for higher wages and shorter hours. The
strike was settled by offering a wage and benefits
package. The following list provides you with the
details concerning the extent to which this strike has
impacted the expansion project."

•
•
•

•

The strike produced a time delay of 6 weeks.
This time delay will cost $S0,000-1S,OOO .
The wage and benefits package will - increase labor
costs bys, and the project cost by 2, or
approximately $100,000.
Management here in South America is concerned that
the construction workers strike will lead to the
formation of an operators union when the plant
becomes operational. Management says that there is a
so, probability that a union of this type will be
formed in the near future.
If this new union is
formed the following costs may arise after the unions
inception.
+

Increase estimated annual operating costs

$7S,OOO, due to the higher wages and benefits
(based on employment of 2SO workers when the

plant is operational).
•

Ivery $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or
below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI

.s,.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 5

&

6

The project is behind schedule. The project director otters
the following comments concerning the progress ot the
project.
"The expansion project is behind schedule. However,
currently there is a more critical issue then the projects
current status compared to our projections. This critical
issue is that Timberland Products, a competitor, has
announced that within 45 days they will start construction
of a plant within 50 miles of our new facility. I don't
need to remind you that Timberland Products is our biggest
competitor with virtually unlimited financial resources.
This new Timberland operating facility is going to produce
roughly the same products that we are designing our new
plant to produce and it will have twice the capacity ot our
new plant. The items listed below describe the impact that
this new Timberland Products plant could possibly have on
the future ot our facility."
•

•

The Timberland plant will reduce the availability of
raw materials. Management estimates the cost ot raw
materials in the local area to increase by 2,,
cutting our profit margin by 10,. This
increase in raw materials cost will reduce the ROI
by 1, or increase costs by $200,000.
Management feels that the Timberland plant will not
have a significant effect on the overall market
supply of finished products because no one
manufacturer has more than a
world wide market
share held by any one company.
Manageaent also feels that the Timberland plant will
not significantly effect the market price or
Amalgamated Porest Product's market share because of the
less than
world wide market share.
Manageaent also feels that the new Timberland
construction project will attract part of our
existing work force. The estimated cost ot the loss
of construction workers is $25,000 which will decrease
ROI .125-.
Timberland has also just hired away one of our key
engineering officers.
Timberland has a well documented history ot slandering
its competitors in order to increase their own political
standing.

2,

•

•

•
•

2,

75

*

Every $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or
below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI

.5, .
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 7

& 8

The project is behind schedule. The project director offers
the following comments concerning the status of the project.
"You have already probably heard of the very sudden and
tragic death of Francisco Allen, the President of A~P, South
America. I can't believe that Francisco was just walking
down the street in Rio one minute and the next minute a car
bomb goes off and he is no longer with us. His tragic death
has really made me think about how quickly and unexpectedly
we can go. It really puts life into a different
perspective. Anyway, enough of the philosophical aside, the
following list of items describe the consequences of Mr.
Allen's very untimely death."

*

*

*
•

•

•

Two of Mr. Allen associates have returned to the
states because of the political unrest in Brazil and
the continuing threat of terrorism. These two men,
Mr. Scott Corley and Mr. Mike Waters, were very key
men in the development of the facility and the
·
eventual operation of the new facility in Brazil.
Mr. Allen was also the main proponent of the Brazil
expansion project. If fact, in the board of
directors meeting in which the vote was taken with
respect to the Brazil project, Mr. Allen swayed at
least 1 vote in order to resolve a , to, split vote into
a slim majority.
The stock price of Al'P fell from ee, to $!1 7 / • •
Management cannot make any speculations as to any other
cause of this decline.
Mr. Allen was also a native South American and had
very strong political connections with the Brazilian
governaent. His replacement, who is coming over from
our parent company, Woodpower, Inc., will not have
any established political connections here in Brazil.
Mr. Allen was just a handshake away from successfully
negotiating a wage subsidy program in return for
employing a totally local work force. This negotiation
will have to be continued by Mr. Allen replacement,
however, the local politicans may not be willing to work
with an "outsider".
Ivery $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or
below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI
. 5-.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 1

&

2

The project is on schedule. The project director provides
the following information concerning the projects progress
over the preceding two month period.
"We are on schedule with regard to our projections. The
past two months contained very little rainfall which really
helped us meet our projections for this time period. This
unusually dry weather should not continue much longer,
because Brazil usually does not vary much from its average
rainfall which is high during this period of the year. The
following list of items describe how this lack of rainfall
over the past two months has impacted the project."

•
*

•

•

•
•

The lack of "rain days" (days in which no work is done
because of the rain) enabled us to stay on schedule. If
we would have experienced normal rainfall we would not
have met our projections.
Savings from not having any "rain days" was approximately
$100,000. Part of this money can be distributed across
other areas of the construction project that are running
above budget .
Over the past 2 months we have lost 75 workers from our
total force of 800. We may have to pay a 10- premium
price to attract the same quality of workers in a short
period of time. We estimate that it will take about 4
weeks to fully replace all 75 of the lost workers. Total
cost to replace these workers is $25,000.
During the past two months, the severe lack of rain
caused the underground water table to drop to very low
level• in th• surrounding project area. Several area
engineer• recommend
spending additional money for a
soil• teat (a total cost of $25 1 000) emphasizing the fact
that if th• test 1• not conducted we could run into more
substantial increase costs in the future. These
engineer• seem to think that the foundation of our
project may be unstable if the underlying water table has
dropped too low or dried up all together. The engineers
used the figure of $250,000 as a reference point when
discussing the possible future cost of not currently
conducting the soils test.
The savings of $100,000 increased our ROI .5- .
Some members of upper management that had hesitated
financing our project in the beginning have been

18

*

encouraged by our ability to remain on schedule.
Consequently, they said they would be willing to support
any additional financing, it necessary.
Every $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or
below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI

-~--
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 3

& 4

The project is on schedule. The project director provides
the following feedback concerning the status of the project.
"We are on schedule but only because of a labor strike that
occurred last month. The laborers were holding out for
higher wages and shorter hours. However, two days after the
strike began management brought in some "scabs" or strike
busters. These "scabs" were willing to work for a lower
wage than the union laborers, so, in effect, we broke the
union and do not have to work with the union again until
they are willing to meet our terms. The following list
provides the details on the extent to which breaking the
union has impacted the expansion project_."

•

•

The lower wages currently being paid will decrease labor
costs bys, and the project. cost by 2, or approximately
$100,000.
However, management here in South America is concerned
that the construction worker's strike, especially in
light of the subsequent union break, will result in the
formation of an operators union when the plant becomes
operational. Management says that there is a so,
probability that a union of this type will be formed in
the near future. If this new union is formed the
following costs may arise after the unions inception:
+ Increase estimated annual operating costs
$75,000, due to the higher wages and benefits
(baaed on employment of 250 workers when the
plant is operational).

•

Because of the union break and the resulting labor cost

savings, Amalgamated Porest Products stock price is up 5
point• over the last several days increasing from 50 to
•
•

ee.

Overall financial iapact of using the "scabs" in place of
the union workers is an increase in our ROI 1.5,.
Every $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or
below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI

.s,.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 5

&

6

The project is on schedule. The project director offers the
following comments concerning the progress of the project.
"The expansion project is on schedule -- while this is good
news-- I have even better news concerning the future of the

,s

project. Timberland Products has announced that within
days they will close their operating plant here in Brazil.
I don't have to remind you that Timberland Products is our
biggest competitor. Listed below are the ramifications of
the Timberland plant closing."
*

*

•

•

•

•

•
•

The closing of the Timberland plant will increase the
availability of raw materials in the immediate area.
Management estimates the cost of raw materials in the
local area to decrease by 2,, increasing our profit
margin 10,. This reduction in raw materials cost will
increase ROI 1,, or save $ 200,000.
Management feels that the Timberland plant closing will
not have a significant effect on the overall market
supply of finished products because no one manufacturer
has more than a
world wide market share.
Management also feels that the closing will not
significantly effect the market price or Amalgamated
Forest Product's market share bacause of the less than 2%
world wide market share by any one company.
The Timberland closing will also increase the supply of
available workers. We should therefore be able to reduce
our wages slightly while not sacrificing our employment
stability at all. This should save us an estimated
$2S,OOO, or .12s, ROI.
However, a little uncertainty does surround this closing .
For instance, we are not really sure why Timberland
Products is closing this plant. Do they know something
about the future of forestry products that would dictate
such action. We do know that this particular Timberland
plant had a reputation of low profitability, but we do
not know the causes of the low profits.
Since the Timberland closing, we have been conducting
serious negotiations with one of Timberland's senior
executives, who could help immensely with our project.
The absence of Timberland's competition should also
improve our negotiations with the local politicians.
Every $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or

2,
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below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 7

&

8

The project is on schedule. The project director offers the
following comments concerning the status of the project.
"You have already probably heard of the recent hiring of Mr.
Francisco Allen to head up Amalgamated Forest Products,
South America. We are very pleased to have acquired Mr.
Allen from one of our competitors, Treeline Products. The
following list of items describe the consequences of the
acquisition of Mr. Allen's employment."

•

•
•

•
•

•
•

Two of Mr. Allen's associates have also joined APP and
will assist Mr. Allen in heading up operations here in
Brazil. Management here has been very impressed with all
three of these men and feel that they should do an
exceptional job of "getting things rolling here in
Brazil."
Our stock was up from $51 7 /a to $54. Management cannot
make any speculations as to any other cause of this
increase other than the acquistion of these key men.
Mr. Allen is also a native South American and has very
strong political connections with the Brazilian
government.
Mr. Allen has had great success in the past negotiating
wage subsidies for employing local workers. We think
that Mr. Allen will be able to negotiate similar deals
for us, therefore, allowing us to reduce our construction
costs.
Mr. Allen will provide Amalgamated Forest Products with a
competitive advantage over Treeline. He brings with him
operation• expertise along with knowledge of all of
Treelines suppliers and customers.
Mr. Allen also has knowledge concerning Treeline's
technical expertise, their weaknesses, and, finally their
pricing stategies.
Ivery $100,000 increase or decrease in funding above or
below the budgeted expenses will adjust the projects ROI

.5,.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS l

&

2

The project is behind schedule. The project director
provides the following information concerning the projects
progress over the preceding two months.
"We are behind with regard to our projections. The past two
months contained above average rainfall which severely
hindered our progress over the past two months. This amount
ot rainfall should not continue since Brazil usually does
not exceed its normal averages of rainfall to this extent.
The following list of items are the ramifications of the
excess rain experienced recently in Brazil."

*
•
*

•

Two weeks delay in construction time.
Increase in project costs.
The significant rainfall my have damaged the foundation.
During the two weeks delay in construction work we lost
part of our construction crew. We will have to pay a
premium in order to attract replacement workers.
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PEEDBACK MONTHS 3

& 4

The project is behind schedule. The project director
provides the following feedback concerning the status of the
project.
"We are behind our projections but only because of a labor
strike that occurred last month. The laborers were holding
out for higher wages and shorter hours. The strike was
settled by offering a wage and benefits package. The
following list provides you the details on the extent to
which this strike has impacted the expansion project."

•
•

The strike produced a significant time delay.
The wage and benefits package will increase labor costs
and the project cost.

FEEDBACK MONTHS S & 6

The project is behind schedule. The project director offers
the following comments concerning the progress of the
project.
"The expansion project is behind schedule. However,
currently there is a more critical issue then the projects
current status compared to our projections. This critical
issue is that Timberland Products, a competitor, has
announced that within
days they will start construction
of a plant within ~O miles of our new facility.
I don't
need to remind you that Timberland Products is our biggest
competitor with virtually unlimited financial resources.
This new Timberland operating facility is going to produce
roughly the same products that we are designing our new
plant to produce and it will have twice the capacity of our
new plant. The items listed below describe the impact that
this new Timberland Products plant could possibly have on
the future of our facility.

,a

*
•

The Timberland plant will reduce the availability of
raw materials.
Management also feels that the new Timberland
construction project will attract part of our
existing work force including some top level executives.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 7 & 8
The project is behind schedule. The project director offers
the following comments concerning the status of the project.
"You have already probably heard of the very sudden and
tragic death of Francisco Allen, the President of AFP, South
America.
I can't believe that Prancisco was just walking
down the street in Rio one minute and the next minute a car
bomb goes off and he is no longer with us. His tragic death
has really made me think about how quickly and unexpectedly
we can go.
It really puts life into a different
perspective. Anyway, enough of the philosophical aside, the
following list of items describe the consequences of Mr.
Allen's very untimely death."
•
•

Two of Mr. Allen associates have returned to the
states because of the political unrest in Brazil and
the continuing threat of terrorism.
Mr. Allen was also a native South American and had
very strong political connections with the Brazilian
government.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 1 & 2
The project is on schedule. The project director provides
the following information concerning the projects progress
over the preceding two month period.
"We are on schedule with regard to our projections. The
past two months contained very little rainfall which really
helped us meet our projections for this time period. This
unusually dry weather should not continue much longer,
because Brazil usually does not vary much from its average
rainfall which high during this period. The following list
of items describe how this lack of rainfall over the past
two months has impacted the project."
•

*

The lack of "rain days" (days in which no work is done
because of the rain) enabled us to stay on schedule.
Over the past 2 months we have lost some of out work
force and we will have to pay a premium in order to
attract quality labor.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 3 & 4
The project is on schedule. The project director provides
the following feedback concerning the status of the project.
"We are on schedule but only because of a labor strike that
occurred last month. The laborers were holding out for
higher wages and shorter hours. However, two days after the
strike began management brought in some "scabs" or strike
busters.
These "scabs" were willing to work for a lower
wage than the union laborers, so, in effect, we broke the
union and do not have to work with the union again _until
they are willing to meet our terms. The following list
provides the details on the extent to which breaking the
union has impacted the expansion project."
•
•

The lower wages currently being paid will decrease labor
costs.
However, management here in South America is concerned
that the construction worker's strike, especially in
light of the subsequent union break, will result in the
formation of an operators union when the plant becomes
operatonal.
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FEEDBACK MONTHS 5 & 6
The project is on schedule. The project director offers the
following comments concerning the progress of the project.
"The expansion project is on schedule -- while this is good
news-- I have even better news concerning the future of the
project. Timberland Products has announced that within 45
days they will close their operating plant here in Brazil.
I don't have to remind you that Timberland Products is our
biggest competitor. Listed below are the ramifications of
the Timberland plant closing."

*
*

The closing of the Timberland plant will increase the
availability of raw materials in the immediate area.
However, a little uncertainty does surround this closing.
For instance, we are not really sure why Timberland
Products is closing this plant.
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